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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a new methodology to compute social cost of living indices. These indices 
indicate whether or not price changes have a favourable (or unfavourable) impact on the 
welfare of the poor. The indices are derived on the basis of two alternative classes of social 
welfare functions. The methodology developed in the paper is applied to compute social cost 
of living indices for Thailand and Korea. The empirical results show that changes in prices have 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The theory of the cost of living index has been developed to give a precise meaning to price 
indices that are widely computed to make cost of living comparisons. Many economists have 
contributed to the development of the theoretical foundation of consumer price indices, the 
most important contributions being those of Hicks (1946), Pollak (1983, 1998), Diewert (1976, 
1990), Samuelson and Swamy (1979) and Konüs (1924). 
Most of the literature on the theory of the cost of living index is focused on the 
comparison of the welfare of a single consumer in different price situations. However, cost 
of living indices defined for a single consumer do not take into account the effect of price 
changes on real income inequality, which always exists in the real world. Muellbauer (1974) 
has shown that the price changes in the United Kingdom since 1974 have had an 
inequality-increasing bias. He used the Atkinson (1970) inequality index in conjunction 
with the linear expenditure system to define a real index of expenditure inequality. 
To take into account the effect of price changes on income inequality, we need to develop 
social cost of living indices which are defined for many individuals in the society. An obvious 
social cost of living index is a simple average of individual cost of living indices. This index is 
called a democratic price index (Prais 1959, Muellbauer 1974). 
The construction of any type of social cost of living index should be derived from a social 
welfare function which incorporates the value judgements of the society. The democratic cost 
of living index does not explicitly use a social welfare function. In this paper, we define social 
cost of living indices in terms of social expenditure functions, which are derived from some 
specific social welfare functions. 
Pollak (1980, 1981) proposed a social cost of living index, which is defined as the ratio  
of the total expenditure required to enable each individual to attain his or her reference 
indifference curve at comparison prices, to the expenditure required at reference prices.  
He calls this index a Scitovsky-Laspeyres group cost of living index. Prais (1959) refers to this 
index as a plutocratic price index. This index has an implicit social welfare function in that it 
assumes that the society is inequality-neutral in its attitude. This means that the index is 
completely insensitive to changes in income inequality caused by price changes. 
In this paper, we develop the idea of a social expenditure function which forms the basis 
for defining the true cost of social cost of living indices. This social expenditure is more general 
than the one suggested by Pollak (1980) and can be made sensitive to changes in inequality 
caused by changes in relative prices.    
The paper derives social cost of living indices on the basis of two alternative classes of 
social welfare functions. The first class of social welfare functions is utilitarian, according to 
which every individual has the same utility function. A class of social cost of living indices is 
derived using a homothetic utility function proposed by Atkinson (1970). The plutonic and 
democratic social costs of living indices are derived as special cases of this class.1  
The second class of social cost of living indices is derived from a class of social welfare 
functions (proposed by Kakwani (1980)) which takes into account the interdependence of 
individual utilities, i.e., the utility of an individual depends not only on his or her consumption 
but also on the consumption of others in society.2 These indices capture the idea of relative 
deprivation suffered by individuals with different income levels.   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  3 
 
 
The most important attribute of the proposed social cost of living indices is that they allow 
us to choose the degree of inequality aversion in the society. The higher the degree of inequality 
aversion, the greater the importance the society attaches to income inequality. We compute  
the social cost of living indices for alternative values of the inequality aversion parameter.  
The paper also attempts to provide an intuitive interpretation of inequality aversion 
parameters based on Okun’s (1975) ‘leaky bucket’ experiment. It shows that Atkinson’s social 
welfare function has much higher tolerance of inefficiency than Kakwani’s social welfare 
function for the same values of the inequality aversion parameter.     
Furthermore, the paper derives the explicit relationship between social cost of living 
indices and aggregate inequality measures. This methodology allowed us to measure the 
impact of relative price changes on the percentage change in aggregate inequality measures. 
Finally, the paper derives the superlative social cost of living indices, which correct for the 
substitution bias. These indices approximate the true social cost of living index to the second 
degree approximation in Taylor’s expansion. This methodology is basically an extension of 
Diewert’s (1976) superlative indices for a single consumer to price indices for many consumers.  
The methodology developed in the paper is applied to compute social cost of living 
indices for Thailand and Korea. The comparison between these two countries is interesting 
because they have different levels of inequality, Korea having a much more equal distribution 
of income than Thailand. 
2  INDIVIDUAL COST OF LIVING INDICES 
Suppose q is a  1 × n  quantity vector, consumption of which provides utility, and which contains 
everything that is relevant to a representative consumer. We assume that u (q) is the utility level 
that the consumer can attain if she consumes the consumption vector q. The conventional 
treatment of consumer behaviour is to maximize the utility function u (q) subject to the 
constraint p′ q = x, where p is a column vector of n market prices and x is income. The solution to 
this maximization problem yields a system of n Marshallian demand equations q = q (x, p). 
Substituting the Marshallian demand equations in the utility function u(q) and solving for 
x gives the expenditure function3 
 
() p , u e x =  (1) 
 
which is the minimum expenditure that is required in order to obtain utility level u at the price 
vector p.4 
Suppose the price vector p changes to p*, then a true cost of living index will measure the 
relative cost of buying a given level of utility at the new prices p* compared to that at the old 
prices p. The Laspeyres-Konüs index is then defined as (Diewert 1983) 
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where u is the base period utility level enjoyed by an individual with income (or total 
expenditure) x. 
LK (x) is the true cost of living index of an individual with income x. It can be calculated 
only if we have complete knowledge of the expenditure function. In practice it is difficult to 
estimate the expenditure function accurately. A practical solution is to assume that the price 
elasticity of substitution is zero. Using Taylor’s expansion, and utilizing the property of the 
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where  () () x q p x v i i i =  and  () x qi  is the consumption of the ith commodity by an individual with 
income x. The terms of the higher order of smallness in (3) have been ignored because of the 
assumption of zero substitution elasticity. Utilizing (3) into (2), LK(x) index becomes 
 






















where  ) ( ) ( x w x i i = η  is the elasticity of e(u, p) with respect to pi. and  () x wi  is the share of the 
ith commodity in the consumption of the individual with income x. The interpretation of this 
elasticity is that if the price of the ith commodity increases by 1 percent, the expenditure of 
individual with income x should increase by  () x wi  percent in order to maintain the same level 
of utility as before the price increase. L(x) is the Laspeyres price index of individual with income 
x, (which is a price index for a single consumer whose income is equal to x). In the next section, 
we generalize the idea of price index of a single individual to a price index of the whole society, 
which consists of many heterogeneous individuals.  
3  SOCIAL COST OF LIVING INDICES 
Suppose ~ u  is the aggregate welfare of the society, obtained by aggregating the levels of 
utilities enjoyed by the individuals in the society. Then we define the social expenditure 
function denoted by  ) , ~ ( p u e  as the minimum money income which, if given to every 
individual, will allow the society to enjoy ~ u  level of social welfare at a given price vector p. 
If the price vector p changes to p*, then every individual should receive the minimum 
income of  ()
* , ~ p u e  in order for the society to enjoy the same level of welfare (as before the 
price change).   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  5 
 
 
The social expenditure function should have the following properties: 
(i)   p) , ~ (u e  is an increasing of function ~ u  for all p. 
(ii)   ) , ~ ( p u e  is increasing and concave in p for every ~ u . 
(iii)   ) , ~ ( p u e  is (positively) linearly homogeneous in p for every ~ u , i.e.  ()( ) p p , ~ , ~ u e u e λ λ = . 
 












Note that if all prices increase by the same proportion, i.e., pp * =λ , then T must be equal 
to λ . This is a necessary requirement of a price index and is satisfied by T in view of the fact that 
p) , ~ (u e  is (positively) linear homogeneous in p, i.e.,  ()( ) p p , ~ , ~ u e u e λ λ = . 
The social expenditure function  p) , ~ (u e  must be a function of the individual expenditure 
functions  () p , u e  for the three properties given above to be satisfied.  
Again assuming that price elasticities of substitution are zero, the true social cost of living 
index in (5) can be approximately written as  
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which may be described as the social elasticity, which is the elasticity of   ) , ~ ( p u e  with respect 
to pi. The interpretation of this elasticity is that if the price of ith commodity increases by 1 
percent, then the minimum money income given to everyone in the society should increase  
by  i η~  percent in order for the society to enjoy the same social welfare as before the price 
increase. L may be called as Laspeyres Social Cost of Living Index. To make this index 
operational we need to specify a social welfare function. This is done in the next section. 
4  ATKINSON’S SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION  
To derive  p) , ~ (u e , we utilize the concept of the “equally distributed equivalent level of 
income” (Atkinson 1970). Thus,  p) , ~ (u e  may be interpreted as the equally distributed 
equivalent level of income, the level which, if received by every individual, would result in 
the same level of social welfare as the present distribution. Like Atkinson, we assume that the 
social welfare function is utilitarian and that every individual has exactly the same utility 6  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 11 
 
 
function. Furthermore, if  () [] p , u e g  is the utility enjoyed by an individual whose income in 
the base period is x (which is equal to  () p , u e ) where g(x) is increasing in x and is concave, 
then the social welfare function will be 




, dx x f u e g W p
 (8) 
 
g[ p) , ~ (u e ] will be the average welfare enjoyed by the society if every individual in it receives an 
income level of  p) , ~ (u e . This, obviously, should be equal to W in (8). Thus, we have 




, , ~ dx x f u e g u e g p p
  
 
which gives the relationship between the expenditure functions of individuals in the society 
and the social expenditure function. 
Since  () ′ > gx 0  for all x and  () p , u e  is an increasing function of u, the social expenditure 
function  p) , ~ (u e  will also be an increasing function of ~ u . Thus, the social expenditure function 
defined in (8) will satisfy property (i) as given above. Property (ii), the social expenditure 
function, which is increasing and concave in p, is also satisfied in view of the assumption that 
g(x) is an increasing and concave function x. 
The third property, i.e.  p) , ~ (u e  is (positively) linearly homogeneous in p for every ~ u , will 
be satisfied only if it is assumed that g(x) is a homothetic function in x. A class of homothetic 
functions is given by (Atkinson 1970)5 
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where  0 > ε  is a measure of relative risk-aversion, which is constant for this utility function. 
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where ‘exp’ stands for exponential function.  Note that this social expenditure function satisfies 
the properties (i), (ii), and (iii) as given above.6 ε  is called the inequality aversion parameter, 
which is interpreted as a measure of relative sensitivity to income transfers at different income 
or expenditure levels. As ε  rises, more and more weight is attached to income transfers at the   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  7 
 
 
lower end of the distribution and less weight to transfers at the top. If ε  = 0, it reflects an 
inequality-neutral attitude, in which case, the society does not care about inequality at all.  
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Let us now consider different members of this class. Substituting ε  = 0 in (12) gives  
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is the average budget share of the ith commodity. It is calculated as the weighted average of 
individual budget shares, where weights are the fraction of aggregate income held by each 
individual. The rich are given greater weight than the poor in the measurement of inflation and 
therefore Prais (1959) called it a Plutonic Cost of Living Index. This index is neutral to any 
change in relative inequality because changes in prices affect every individual proportionally 
to his or her income. This index, popularly known as Laspeyres index, does not tell us whether 
or not the price changes hurt the poor proportionally more than the rich. Almost all countries 
in the world use this index to measure their inflation rate. 
Substituting ε  = 1 in (12) gives  
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where   
()() ~ w w xfxd x ii = ∫
∞
0  
is the average of the individual budget shares of the society. Since every individual gets the 
same weight irrespective of income, Prais (1959) called this index the Democratic Cost of 
Living Index. 
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where wi  is the ith commodity budget share of an average consumer in the society. wi  will 
generally be different from  ~ wi . If the ith commodity is a necessary good such as food, wi (x) 
will be higher for the poor than for the non-poor. For such commodities, therefore,  ~ wi  > wi .  
If the ith commodity, however, is a luxury good, then  ~ wi  < wi . The second term in (16) will be 
positive (negative) if the prices of necessary (luxury) goods increase at a faster rate than the 
prices of luxury (necessary) goods. Thus, this term indicates whether price changes hurt the 
poor more than the rich. If L(1)-L(0) is positive (negative), changes in prices hurt the poor (rich) 
more than the rich (poor), which implies that L(1) is sensitive to the changes in real inequality 
in the society as a result of relative price changes.  























where wip is the budget share of the poorest person in the society. This index will be used if the 
society is only concerned with the welfare of the poorest person in the society. This index is 
consistent with Rawls’ theory of justice, which gives all the weight to the worst-off person in 
the society. This may be regarded as an extreme situation. In practice, ε  = 2 will probably 
provide a reasonable social cost of living index. Nonetheless, we emphasize that the choice of 
ε  depends on the kind of society for which the index is computed. If a society has a high 
degree of inequality, then a higher value of ε  may be considered to be more appropriate.8 
5  SOCIAL COST OF LIVING INDICES WHEN SOCIAL WELFARE 
FUNCTION IS INTERDEPENDENT 
In the previous section we derived social cost of living indices from a class of social welfare 
functions in which the utility or welfare of an individual depended only on his or her own 
income or consumption. In this section we derive a class of social cost of living indices which 
takes into account the interdependence of individual utilities. The utility of an individual 
depends not only on his or her income but also on the incomes of others in the society. Such a   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  9 
 
 
social welfare function captures the idea of relative deprivation suffered by individuals with 
different income levels; the lower a person is on the welfare scale, the greater is his or her 
sense of deprivation with respect to others in the society. 
Sen (1974) proposed a social welfare function which, by taking into account the 
proportion of persons who are richer, captures the relative deprivation suffered by individuals. 
Kakwani (1980) proposed a generalization of Sen’s social welfare function, which allows a 
judgement to be made about the society’s degree of aversion to inequality. The social 
expenditure function based on this social welfare function may be defined as  








where F(x) is the distribution function and is the proportion of people in the society who have 
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which, on substituting in (6), gives a class of social cost of living indices as  
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The parameter k can be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion. In particular, k = 0 
implies an inequality-neutral attitude for the society. For k = 0, L*(k) is equal to L(0) as given in 
(13). It can easily be demonstrated (Kakwani 1980) that 
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where µ is the mean income of the society and G is the Gini index, which is a well-known 
measure of inequality,  () () vx p qx ii i =  is the expenditure of a person with income x on the ith 
commodity at the base year price, µ i is the mean expenditure of the society on the ith 
commodity and Ci is the concentration index of the ith commodity.9 10  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 11 
 
 





















where Ei = Ci - G. 
 
Ei = Ci - G is the elasticity index proposed by Kakwani (1980). The ith commodity is luxury 
(necessity) if Ei is greater (less) than zero. If the prices of necessities (luxuries) increase faster 
than those of luxuries (necessities), the second term in (20) will be positive (negative). Thus, the 
sign of the second term in (23) tells us whether or not the price changes have a relatively larger 
adverse impact on the poor. 
The social cost of living index K*(k) can be computed for any value of k. The larger the 
value of k we choose, the greater is our concern for the poor. 
6  IMPACT OF PRICE CHANGE ON INEQUALITY 
As noted in the previous sections, the social cost of living indices provide the means to assess 
whether price changes have an adverse impact on the poor or the non-poor (or how price 
changes affect aggregate inequality in a society). In this section, we derive the explicit 
relationship between the social cost of living indices and change in the aggregate inequality.  
Following Atkinson (1970), inequality in the society is defined as 
) (
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is the mean income of the society in the base period and  ) , ~ ( p u e  is a monetary measure of the 
society’s standard of living in the base period. 
Suppose the price vector p changes to p* in the next period, then  ) , ~ (
* p u e  will be the 
social expenditure per person in order for the society to enjoy the same level of social welfare 
u ~  (as in the base period). The inequality after the price change will be given by 
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Using (25) and (26) in (5) gives  






















where T is the true social cost of living index as defined in (5). Note that the first term on the 
right hand side is the Scitovsky-Laspeyres Social Cost of Living Index as proposed by 
Pollak(1981). This index is neutral to any change in inequality. The second term on the right 
hand side of (27) measures the distributional impact of price change. This term is positive if 
changes in prices increase aggregate inequality, and will be negative if price changes reduce 
inequality in the society. If we assume that substitution bias is zero, the impact of prices on 
Atkinson’s inequality measures will be given by 
    
) ( ) 0 (
)] ( 1 )][ 0 ( ) ( [
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which allows us to compute the percentage change in inequality as a consequence of changes 
in prices. 
7  SUBSTITUTION BIAS 
The social costs of living indices have been defined in terms of individual expenditure 
functions. To make these indices operational, we assumed that price elasticity of substitution is 
zero for all consumers. In doing so, we have been assuming that no consumer substitution 
occurs in response to changes in relative prices. Although this assumption is overly restrictive, 
there exists no easy way to deal with this issue in practical situations. 
One obvious method that deals with the issue is to estimate the expenditure function for 
each consumer by utilizing an estimated system of demand equations (Braithwait, 1980, 
Jorgenson and Slesnick, 1983). This method can be implemented with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy only for a small number of broad commodity groups. Since the number of 
parameters to be estimated in a full system of consumer demand rises with the square of (one 
less than) the number of commodities, the method becomes impossible to implement at any 
detailed level of commodity disaggregation (Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches and 
Jorgenson 1998). Moreover, this method would become even more difficult to implement 
when we are attempting to estimate the social cost of living indices, which would involve 
estimating the substitution bias for each of many consumers. 
A more attractive alternative is to use superlative indices, pioneered by Diewert (1976). 
These indices approximate the true cost of living index to the second degree without requiring 12  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 11 
 
 
econometrics for implementation. An extension of this approach to social costs of living is 
discussed in this section. 
The Laspeyres-Konus index LK(x) in (2) was approximated by the Laspeyres index L(x) by 
utilizing the first term in the Taylor’s expansion.  To take into account the substitution bias we 
have to utilize the second degree approximation in the Taylor’s expansion. It can be easily 
shown that    
∑ + − + =
n
i i i i x x p p p u e Log p u e Log
1
* * * )] ( ) ( )[ log( (log
2
1
)] , ( [ )] , ( [ η η
 (29) 
 
where   ) (x i η  and  ) (
* x i η  are the elasticities of base and terminal individual expenditure 
functions with respect to the price of the ith commodity in the base and terminal years, 
respectively. Substituting (29) into (2), we obtain the second order approximation of the 
Laspeyres-Konus index for an individual with income x as 
∑ + − =
n
i i i i x x p p x T
1
* * * )] ( ) ( )][ log( ) [log(
2
1
exp[ ) ( η η
           (30) 
 
The social cost of living index can be derived from (30) if we substitute the elasticities of 
the individual expenditure functions by the elasticities of the social expenditure functions. 
Thus we have a new social cost of living index 
∑ + − =
n
i i i i p p T
1
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These elasticities can be computed for both Atkinson and Kakwani classes of social 
welfare functions (see equations (11) and (19)). The social cost of living indices so obtained will 
take account of substitution biased at least up to the second order approximation. To be able 
to implement this methodology we need to have at least two household surveys in order to 
calculate these elasticities in the base and terminal years.    
8  ‘LEAKY BUCKET’10  
In this paper we have developed the social costs of living indices utilizing two major classes of 
social welfare functions, namely, Atkinson’s and Kakwani’s. In Atkinson’s social welfare 
function, the utility of an individual depends only on her own consumption, whereas in 
Kakwani’s social welfare function the utility of an individual depends not only on her own 
consumption but also on how many persons in the relevant society have higher consumption 
than her. It is difficult to make a recommendation about the choice between the two classes of   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  13 
 
 
social welfare functions. Since Kakwani’s function captures the idea of relative deprivation 
suffered by individuals with different income levels, some policy-makers may find it a more 
attractive choice. However, even if we agree on the functional form, it is far more difficult to 
arrive at an agreement on the value of inequality aversion parameter; ε  for Atkinson’s and k 
for Kakwani’s. We only know from both functions that, as an inequality aversion parameter 
increases, the greater weight is given to incomes at the lower end of the income distribution.  
A society which has a higher aversion to inequality will choose a higher value of the inequality 
aversion parameter.11 This information is not sufficient to be able to choose a single value of 
either ε  or k. 
We attempt to motivate the choice based on Okun’s (1975) ‘leaky bucket’ experiment. 
Imagine a hypothetical society consisting of two persons: one is poorer than the other and 
their incomes are $50 and $500, respectively. To have a grasp of welfare in this society we 
might think of a function where total welfare increases whenever the incomes of these two 
persons grow and whenever the increase in income of one individual does not decrease the 
income of the other. This is the famous Pareto optimality criterion. We may introduce the 
second property to this function to state that any transfer of income from rich to poor 
increases social welfare. This is called the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer. The basic idea 
behind this principle is that the gain of $1 by the poor is more valuable to the society than the 
loss of $1 to the rich. Taken all together, these criteria imply that any redistribution of income 
from rich to poor will increase the social welfare, provided that total income available to the 
society does not decrease. 
Since the consumption patterns of the poor and rich are different, any change in relative 
prices will change the real distribution of income in favour of either the poor or the rich.  
A change in relative prices is equivalent to transferring incomes between the poor and the rich. 
For instance, if the government subsidises commodities that are consumed by the poor, it is 
basically transferring income from the rich to the poor. Thus, the main motive of constructing 
social cost of living indices is to capture the impact of changes in relative prices on the living 
standard of the poor.  
It must be pointed out that there is no costless transfer of money from the rich to the 
poor. The money must be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket (Okun, 1975): 
some of the money will always disappear in transit so the poor will not receive all the money 
that is taken from the rich. The leakage basically represents inefficiency. The issue is: how much 
inefficiency should a society tolerate? The answer is provided by the value of inequality 
aversion chosen by the society: the higher the value of the inequality aversion parameter, the 
greater the society’s tolerance for inefficiency. Thus, the percentage leakage is a monotonically 
increasing function of the inequality aversion parameter.  
To illustrate how the two types of social welfare functions interplay with leakages, let us 
suppose we transfer $25 (5 percent of the income of the rich) from the rich to the poor, but 
that the poor will get less than $25 depending on how much the leakage is. The transfer will 
stop at the point when social welfare becomes negative (when transfer becomes undesirable). 
Table 1 presents the percentage of leakage when change in social welfare becomes negative 
and total welfare is reduced. We call this as tolerable level of leakage, which varies with values 




Percentage of tolerable leakage 
Inequality aversion parameter  Atkinson’s welfare function  Kakwani’s welfare function 
0  0  0 
0.5  66.5  30.0 
1.0  89.5  50.0 
1.5  96.5  65.0 
2.0  99.0  75.0 
3.0  99.9  87.5 
FIGURE 1 













In the case of Atkinson’s social welfare function when ε  = 1, the tolerable leakage is 89.5 
percent. In other words, we would be willing to waste about 90 percent of the amount before 
we regard the transfer as undesirable. When ε  = 2, the tolerable leakage is as high as 99 
percent. In the case of Kakwani’s social welfare function, the tolerable leakage is 50 percent 
when k = 1 (which is the welfare function implied by the Gini index). Figure 1 shows that 
Atkinson’s social welfare gives a much higher tolerance level than Kakwani’s social welfare 
function at each value of inequality aversion parameter. Thus, the society behaving along the 
lines of an Atkinson’s social welfare function is much more concerned with inequality than a 
society behaving according to Kakwani’s social welfare function for the same value of 
inequality aversion parameter.  
Although we have not provided a clear-cut answer to the question as to what value of 
inequality aversion parameter we should choose, the above intuitive interpretation of 
inequality aversion parameters may help in making this choice.   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  15 
 
 
9  IMPLEMENTATION OF METHODOLOGY  
To implement the methodology discussed in the previous sections, we require two data 
sources. One is the household expenditure surveys, which provide detailed expenditures of 
each household in monetary terms, and the other is the average market prices of various items 
of consumption. It is important that market prices of individual items of consumption must 
match with expenditure categories given in the household surveys. 
To estimate the social elasticities accurately from the sample households, we need to 
know the weight attached to each sampled household to enable the data provided by these 
households to be expanded to obtain estimates for the defined population. For instance, if M is 
the number of households in the population and m is the sample of households selected in the 
survey, then the weight attached to every household will be M/m. This weight is not correct 
because it is based on the assumption that every household in the population has exactly the 
same probability of being selected. The weight given to each household must be determined 
by the probability of selection within a stratum adjusted to take account of non-responding 
households. These weights are estimated using the sample design used in the survey. Most of 
the household surveys provide these weights. These weights are called household weights 
because they sum up to the total number of households in the population. 
Since we are interested in the welfare of individuals, we must obtain the individual 
weights, which can be obtained by multiplying the household weights by the household 
size. These individual weights may be called population weights because they sum up to 


















   
Suppose total household consumption consists of n individual items of consumption and 
the prices of each of these items are given from market surveys in the base and terminal years, 
then we can estimate Atkinson’s class of social cost of living indices from (12) if we know the 
social elasticity  ) ( ~ ε η i  for each item of consumption.  
Suppose  xij is the per capita consumption of the ith item by the jth household and xj is the 
per capita total consumption of the jth household, then the budget share of the ith item by the  











ij w for all j = 1, 2, …, m. The social 
elasticity for the Atkinson’s class of social welfare functions can then be estimated as 
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To compute social welfare elasticity for Kakwani’s class of social welfare functions, we 
need to estimate the probability distribution function F(x) from the discrete data so that we 





















. Then social elasticity for Kakwani’s class of social welfare functions is 
estimated using (19) by 














j j ij j
r x a








Substituting this elasticity in (20) gives Kakwani’s class of social cost of living indices.12  
The methodology presented here can be applied to any specific demographic groups 
such as the elderly and children, who have different consumption patterns from the general 
population. For instance, elderly people have to spend a greater share of their total 
expenditure on health care, whereas families with children usually spend more on education. 
Within these groups also there are both poor and rich households, which have different 
expenditure patterns. To take account of these differences, we could compute group cost of 
living indices using the methodology presented in this paper.13  
These indices can play an important role in maintaining the standard of living of 
vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and children.     
In the above methodology, we have used per capita total expenditure as a measure of 
household welfare. This is an approximate measure of household welfare because it assumes 
that the basic needs of every household member are the same irrespective of their age and 
sex. Furthermore, the larger households enjoy economies of scale, which can further bias the 
empirical results. The methodology presented here can be easily modified to take account of 
these refinements by utilizing adult equivalence scale and economies of scale parameter 
(Deaton 1998). We did not follow this path because we did not have credible estimates of 
equivalence scale and economies scale parameters.    Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  17 
 
 
10  SOCIAL COST OF LIVING INDICES FOR THAILAND 
In this section, we use the methodology developed in this paper to compute the social cost of 
living indices for Thailand. The indices were computed annually, covering the period from 
1986 to 1995. The social weights developed in the paper were computed using the Socio-
economic Survey (SES) data for 1990. The price indices of various goods and services were 
obtained from the Department of Business Economics of the Ministry of Commerce in 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
The National Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand conducts the country’s Socio-economic 
Survey on a regular basis. The surveys cover all private non-institutional households residing 
permanently in municipal areas, sanitary districts and villages. However, they exclude that part 
of the population living in transient hotels, rooming houses, boarding schools, military 
barracks, temples, hospitals, prisons and other institutions (see Report of the 1990 Household 
Socio-economic Survey, NSO, Thailand). 
The NSO Thailand provided us with unit record data giving expenditures on a wide 
variety of goods and services for 13,186 households. Since we could obtain a very detailed 
disaggregation of goods and sources, the matching of the data from the two sources was 
not a problem. 
The social cost of living indices and inflation rates are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for different 
values of inequality aversion parameters. Table 2 is based on the utilitarian social welfare function, 
whereas Table 3 is computed on the basis of the interdependent social welfare function. 
It may be recalled that when the inequality aversion parameter is zero, the society is 
completely inequality-neutral. The higher the inequality aversion parameter, the greater the 
importance society attaches to inequality. It can be seen that the inflation rate from Table 2 in the 
1987-88 period is 3.8 per cent when the inequality aversion parameter is equal to zero. When the 
inequality aversion parameter is equal to 2.0, the inflation rate is 5.2 per cent. This means that 
during the 1987-88 period, price changes in affected the poor much more than the rich. 
Consequently, real inequality in the society increased as a result of price changes.  
TABLE 2 
Price indices and inflation rates in Thailand 
Based on Atkinson's social welfare function 
Social Cost Living Index (1986 = 100)  Annual Inflation rate  Years 
When inequality aversion parameter (ε ) 
is equal to 
When inequality aversion parameter (ε ) 
is equal to 
  0  0.5  1  1.5  2  0  0.5  1  1.5  2 
1986  100  100  100  100  100  -  -  -  -  - 
1987  102.4  102.5  102.5  102.6  102.6  2.4  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.6 
1988  106.3  106.8  107.2  107.6  107.9  3.8  4.2  4.5  4.9  5.2 
1989  110.7  111.5  112.1  112.6  113.0  4.2  4.4  4.6  4.7  4.7 
1990  116.4  117.2  117.7  118.2  118.5  5.1  5.1  5.0  5.0  4.9 
1991  122.8  123.5  124.1  124.5  124.9  5.5  5.4  5.4  5.4  5.3 
1992  127.4  128.3  128.9  129.4  129.7  3.8  3.9  3.9  3.9  3.9 
1993  131.9  132.3  132.6  132.7  132.9  3.5  3.2  2.8  2.6  2.4 
1994  137.4  138.1  138.4  138.6  138.7  4.2  4.4  4.4  4.4  4.4 
1995  144.3  145.3  145.8  146.1  146.2  5.0  5.2  5.3  5.4  5.4 
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If we look at the entire period from 1986 to 1995, we find that the overall price index 
increased by 44.3 per cent when the inequality aversion parameter is equal to zero but when it 
takes a value equal to 2, the prices increased by 46.2 per cent. This means that price changes in the 
1986 - 1995 period favoured the rich more than the poor (Table 2). 
Table 3, based on the interdependent social welfare function, shows much larger adverse 
effects of price changes on the poor. When k = 3.0 the index increased by 48.4 per cent between 
1986 and 1995 whereas when k = 0, the increase is only 44.3 per cent. This means that an inflation 
rate of 4.1 per cent is attributed to inequality increasing the bias of price changes. 
TABLE 3 
Social cost of living index estimated based on interdependent social welfare 
Based on interdependent social welfare function 
Social Cost Living Index (1986 =100)  Annual Inflation rate  Years 
when inequality aversion parameter (k)  
is equal to 
when inequality aversion parameter (k)  
is equal to 
  0  1  2  3  0  1  2  3 
1986  100  100  100  100  -  -  -  - 
1987  102.4  102.6  102.6  102.6  2.4  2.6  2.6  2.6 
1988  106.3  107.3  107.9  108.2  3.8  4.6  5.1  5.4 
1989  110.7  112.3  113.1  113.5  4.2  4.7  4.8  4.9 
1990  116.4  118.0  118.7  119.1  5.1  5.1  5.0  4.9 
1991  122.8  124.5  125.3  125.8  5.5  5.5  5.6  5.6 
1992  127.4  129.5  130.4  130.9  3.8  4.0  4.1  4.1 
1993  131.9  133.0  133.5  133.8  3.5  2.8  2.4  2.2 
1994  137.4  139.2  139.7  140.1  4.2  4.6  4.7  4.7 
1995  144.3  147.0  147.8  148.4  5.0  5.6  5.8  5.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Next, we want to know the impact of price changes on inequality. Inequality can be measured 
in many ways depending on what social welfare function is assumed. If we assume the class of   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  19 
 
 
interdependent social welfare functions, then the inequality measure will vary with the inequality 
aversion parameter k; the larger the inequality aversion parameter, the greater is the weight 
attached to poor individuals in the society. When k = 1, the inequality measure is the well-known 
Gini index. Table 4 presents the values of inequality measures for different values of k. The values in 
1990 are the actual values of inequality measures as calculated from the 1990 Socio-economic 
Survey data. The values in other years are the real values of inequality measures, which take 
account of relative price changes.  
TABLE 4 
Impact of prices on inequality in Thailand 
Based on interdependent social welfare function 
Years  Inequality measures 
when inequality aversion parameter (k) 
is equal to 
Annual  percentage change in inequality 
when inequality aversion parameter (k ) 
is equal to 
   1*  2  3  1  2  3 
1986  49.8  49.8  49.8  -  -  - 
1987  49.9  49.9  49.9  0.2  0.3  0.3 
1988  50.4  50.7  50.9  1.0  1.5  1.8 
1989  50.7  51.1  51.4  0.6  0.9  1.0 
1990  49.8  49.8  49.8  -1.8  -2.5  -3.0 
1991  50.9  51.5  51.8  2.3  3.3  3.9 
1992  51.2  51.9  52.3  0.6  0.8  1.0 
1993  50.6  51.0  51.2  -1.2  -1.7  -2.0 
1994  51.2  51.7  52.0  1.1  1.3  1.4 
1995  52.2  53.0  53.5  2.0  2.6  2.9 
1986-95  -  -  -  4.8  6.4  7.3 
* is the Gini index. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
It is noted that from Table 4 that annual increases in prices have generally increased 
inequality every year except in 1989-90 and 1992-93. If we look at the entire period from 
1986 to 1995, we find that price changes had the effect of increasing inequality. For 
instance, the inequality measure for k = 1, which is the Gini index, increased by 4.8 percent 
due to changes in relative prices between 1986 and 1995. Thus, the poor were adversely 
affected by price changes. It is interesting that when k = 3, the percentage increase in 
inequality is 7.3 percent, which means that we give greater weight to the poor, the 
increase in inequality is higher. This implies that the ultra-poor have been more adversely 
affected than the poor due to changes in relative prices.14  
11  SOCIAL COSTS OF LIVING INDICES FOR KOREA 
In this section, we compute the social costs of living indices for Korea. Korea is an interesting 
case because it has maintained a much more equal distribution of income than Thailand. 
Moreover, Korea conducts the Family Income and Expenditure (FIAE) surveys every year, so it is 
possible to compute superlative indices discussed in Section 7.  
We computed the social costs of living indices annually covering the period from 1990 to 
1999. Tables 5 and 6 give the social costs of living indices based on the Atkinson and 
interdependent classes of social welfare functions. The social elasticities were computed using 
the 1990 Family Income and Expenditure Survey. The estimates of social costs of living indices 
given in these tables do not take account of substitution bias and are based on fixed social 




Social cost of living indices and inflation rates in Korea 
Based on Atkinson's social welfare function 
Social Cost Living Index (1990 = 100)  Annual Inflation rate  Years 
when inequality aversion parameter (k) 
is equal to 
when inequality aversion parameter (k) 
is equal to 
   0  1  2  3  0  1  2  3 
1990  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  -  -  -  - 
1991  108.7  108.9  109.1  109.2  8.7  8.9  9.1  9.2 
1992  114.9  115.1  115.3  115.5  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7 
1993  120.1  120.2  120.4  120.5  4.5  4.5  4.4  4.4 
1994  128.0  128.3  128.6  128.8  6.6  6.7  6.8  6.9 
1995  133.2  133.5  133.7  133.9  4.1  4.0  4.0  4.0 
1996  140.0  140.2  140.4  140.6  5.1  5.1  5.0  5.0 
1997  146.3  146.5  146.7  147.0  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5 
1998  158.1  158.5  159.0  159.6  8.1  8.2  8.3  8.5 
1999  159.8  160.3  160.9  161.6  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
TABLE 6 
Social cost of living indices and inflation rates in Korea 
Based on interdependent social welfare function 
Social Cost Living Index (1990 = 100)  Annual Inflation rate 
when inequality aversion parameter (k) 
is equal to 
when inequality aversion parameter (k) 
is equal to 
Years 
0  1  2  3  0  1  2  3 
1990  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  -  -  -  - 
1991  108.7  109.0  109.1  109.2  8.7  9.0  9.1  9.2 
1992  114.9  115.2  115.3  115.4  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7 
1993  120.1  120.3  120.4  120.5  4.5  4.4  4.4  4.4 
1994  128.0  128.4  128.6  128.8  6.6  6.8  6.8  6.9 
1995  133.2  133.6  133.8  133.9  4.1  4.0  4.0  4.0 
1996  140.0  140.3  140.5  140.6  5.1  5.0  5.0  5.0 
1997  146.3  146.6  146.8  146.9  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5 
1998  158.1  158.7  159.1  159.4  8.1  8.3  8.4  8.5 
1999  159.8  160.6  161.1  161.4  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The results show that the inflation rate in Korea has generally been very high. The inflation 
rate rose to more than 8 percent in the 1997-98 period, when Korea was struck by a very severe 
economic crisis. The Korean won depreciated substantially, which fuelled inflation. However, in 
the subsequent period, the inflation rate dropped to just over 1 percent, which was mainly due 
to a drastic contraction of the aggregate GDP. It is interesting to note that increasing the value 
of the inequality aversion parameter does not change much the annual inflation rates, as is 
indicated by Figure 3. It means that the impact of relative price changes on inequality is very 
small in Korea. This is also indicated by the changes in inequality due to price changes, as 
presented in Table 7. It is also interesting to note that since the economic crisis hit Korea in 
1997, price changes have increased inequality, which implies that the price changes during the 
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TABLE 7 
Measuring the impact of price changes on inequality in Korea 
Inequality measures  Annual percentage change in inequality 
when inequality aversion parameter (k)  
is equal to 
when inequality aversion parameter (k)  
is equal to  Years 
1*  2  3  1  2  3 
1990  29.9  39.4  44.7  -  -  - 
1991  30.1  39.7  44.9  0.7  0.6  0.6 
1992  30.1  39.7  45.0  0.2  0.2  0.2 
1993  30.0  39.7  44.9  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2 
1994  30.3  39.9  45.2  0.8  0.7  0.7 
1995  30.2  39.9  45.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1 
1996  30.2  39.9  45.2  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0 
1997  30.3  40.0  45.3  0.3  0.4  0.4 
1998  30.9  40.9  46.4  2.0  2.2  2.2 
1999  31.2  41.3  46.8  1.1  1.1  1.0 
90-99  -  -  -  4.6  4.8  4.8 
* is the Gini index. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The impact on inequality of changes in relative prices depends on how great is the 
variation in consumption patterns of the population across income groups. Since Korea is a 
very homogeneous country with relatively low inequality, we would expect that the impact of 
changes in relative prices on inequality will be small. This is perhaps the reason why the impact 
of prices on inequality in Korea is lower than that in Thailand, where inequality is very high. 
This suggests that social costs of living indices are more important in high inequality countries 
than in low inequality countries with homogeneous population.       22  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 11 
 
 
Next, we compute the superlative social cost of living indices for Korea. In computing 
these indices, we had to compute the social elasticities for every year from 1990 to 1999.  
The results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. It can be seen that the inflation rates computed 
from superlative social cost of living indices are not very different from the social cost of living 
indices based on fixed social weights. This implies that the substitution bias captured by the 
superlative indices is very small, being almost negligible. These results may suggest that fixed 
social weights provide reasonably accurate estimates of inflation rates in Korea.15 
TABLE 8 
Superlative social cost of living indices and inflation rates in Korea 
Based on Atkinson's social welfare function 
Social Cost Living Index (1990 = 100)  Annual Inflation rate 
when inequality aversion parameter (k) 
is equal to 
when inequality aversion parameter (k)  
is equal to 
Years 
0  1  2  3  0  1  2  3 
1990  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  -  -  -  - 
1991  108.7  108.9  109.0  109.2  8.7  8.9  9.0  9.2 
1992  114.9  115.1  115.2  115.4  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7 
1993  120.2  120.3  120.4  120.6  4.6  4.5  4.5  4.5 
1994  128.1  128.3  128.6  128.8  6.6  6.7  6.8  6.8 
1995  133.5  133.7  133.9  134.1  4.2  4.2  4.2  4.1 
1996  140.6  140.8  140.9  141.1  5.3  5.3  5.3  5.2 
1997  147.2  147.4  147.6  147.8  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.8 
1998  159.5  160.0  160.6  161.2  8.4  8.6  8.8  9.0 
1999  161.2  161.8  162.4  163.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
TABLE 9 
Superlative social cost of living indices and inflation rates in Korea 
Social Cost Living Index (1990 = 100)  Annual Inflation rate 
when inequality aversion parameter (k) 
is equal to 
when inequality aversion parameter (k)  
is equal to 
Years 
0  1  2  3  0  1  2  3 
1990  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  -  -  -  - 
1991  108.7  109.0  109.1  109.1  8.7  9.0  9.1  9.1 
1992  114.9  115.1  115.3  115.4  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7 
1993  120.2  120.3  120.4  120.5  4.6  4.5  4.5  4.5 
1994  128.1  128.4  128.6  128.7  6.6  6.7  6.8  6.8 
1995  133.5  133.8  133.9  134.0  4.2  4.2  4.1  4.1 
1996  140.6  140.8  141.0  141.1  5.3  5.3  5.2  5.2 
1997  147.2  147.5  147.6  147.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7 
1998  159.5  160.3  160.7  160.9  8.4  8.7  8.8  8.9 
1999  161.2  162.0  162.5  162.8  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
There can be many reasons for substitution bias being so small in Korea. One possible 
reason may be that the superlative index is underestimating the true cost of living index.  
This is because superlative index is a close approximation if preferences are homothetic 
(income elasticities are unitary). This may be a strong requirement. Another reason may be that 
we have not used sufficiently disaggregated commodity groups. Finally, in countries such as 
the United States, people have a much greater choice of commodities and therefore greater 
possibilities for substitution.   Hyun H. Son  and  Nanak Kakwani  23 
 
 
12  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have developed a new methodology to compute social cost of living indices. 
These indices indicate whether or not price changes have a favourable or unfavourable impact 
on the welfare of the poor. The application of this methodology to the Thai and Korean data 
shows that the price changes have adversely affected the poor more than the non-poor. 
Thailand has very high income inequality which has been increasing more or less 
monotonically (Kakwani, 1997). The government of Thailand has been deeply concerned by 
the increasing trend in inequality. To formulate policies to reduce inequality, it is important to 
know the causes of the increase in inequality. This paper has provided a useful link between 
price changes and income inequality.  
The impact of changes in relative prices on inequality depends on how great is the 
variation in consumption patterns of the population across income groups. Since Korea is a 
very homogeneous country with relatively low inequality, we would expect that the impact of 
changes in relative prices on inequality will be small. This is probably the reason why the 
impact of prices on inequality in Korea is lower than that in Thailand, where inequality is very 
high. This suggests that social costs of living indices are more important in high inequality 
countries than in low inequality countries with homogeneous population.    
In this paper we have attempted to correct for the substitution bias by calculating the 
superlative social cost of living indices. These indices can be computed using the usual 
household surveys without requiring panel data.  
Our empirical results assume that all households face the same prices for various 
commodities. This is an unrealistic assumption because regional price differences exist in both 
Thailand and Korea. Fortunately, the information on regional prices is generally available in 
many countries. It would therefore be a basis for worthwhile research in future to extend the 
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1. We would like to acknowledge an important contribution of Silber (1986), who proposed a class of group cost of living 
indices based on Atkinson’s social welfare function. Our approach is based on the economic theory of index numbers 
whereas his approach is based on fixed basket. 
2. Sen’s (1974) social welfare function is a particular member of this class. 
3. This function is also known as ‘cost function’ in the literature but we will refer to it as ‘expenditure’. 
4. The expenditure function has three properties: 
(i).  e(u,p) is increasing in u for every p. 
(ii).  e(u,p) is (positively) linearly homogeneous in p for every u, ie.  ) , ( ) , ( p u e p u e λ λ =   
(iii).  e(u,p) is concave in p for every u. 
5. It is essential to assume a homothetic function otherwise we will not be able to satisfy a basic requirement that if all 
prices increase in the same proportion, the true cost of living index should also increase by the same proportion. 
6. From the property of expenditure function, we know that  ) , ( ) , ( p u e p u e λ λ =  is always satisfied, so substituting 
this in (10), it is easy to see that  ) , ~ ( ) , ~ ( p u e p u e λ λ = will always be satisfied or in other words, the social expenditure 
function  ) , ~ ( p u e is homogeneous in p. Thus, the entire class of homothetic functions in (9) will always satisfy the basic 
property that if all prices increase in the same proportion, the true cost of living index in (5) will also increase by the same 
proportion.    
7. Silber’s (1986) social cost of living index in our notation is given by  
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where L(x) is given in (4). 
8. See Section 10 for further discussion on this point. 
9. For a detailed discussion of concentration indices, see Kakwani (1977, 1980a). 
10. The discussions given in this section are motivated by the comments made by one of the referees. 
11. It is not necessary that societies with higher inequality will have higher aversion to inequality. We do propose a higher 
inequality aversion parameter for societies with higher inequality. 
12. The STATA–do file for calculating all the social cost of living indices described in this paper is available from the 
authors upon request. 
13. Some attempts have been made to compute Laspeyres-type price indices for elderly in the Unite States (see Boskin 
and Hurd (1985) and Amble and Stewart (1994)).  Jorgenson and Slesnick (1983) have estimated system of demand 
equations for different demographic groups to calculate their cost-of-living indices. For a useful discussion of this issue 
see Silber(1986), Michael (1979) and Minzly(1980). 
14. As k increases, greater weight is given to the persons at the bottom of the expenditure distribution, which means that 
if inflation rate increases with k, the ultra poor are more adversely affected than just poor. 
15. Many empirical studies have indicated that the substitution bias is small enough that it can probably be neglected. 
(Braithwait (1975), Christensen and Manser (1974) and Manser (1975). Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches and Jorgenson 
(1998) report a substitution bias of .4 percentage points per year, which is much larger than our estimates for Korea. International Poverty Centre
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